

Message Text

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ACTION TRSE-00

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06
AID-05 COME-00 EB-08 FRB-03 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04
SIL-01 OMB-01 STR-07 CEA-01 NEA-10 IO-13 AGRE-00
/117 W

-----057209 311209Z /11

R 310857Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3736

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MANILA 5123

USADB

PASS TREASURY FOR NACHMANOFF

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, VM
SUBJECT: ADB RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM REACH CRITICAL STAGE

1. PRESIDENT YOSHIDA ASKED TO SEE ME ON AFTERNOON OF
MARCH 30 TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF THE BANK'S RELATIONS WITH
VIETNAM. VICE PRESIDENTS KATZ AND BAMBAWALE ALSO WERE
PRESENT.

2. PRESIDENT STATED THAT VIETNAM HAD PAID ITS OBLIGATIONS
IN FULL TO THE BANK THROUGH NOVEMBER 30 AND NOW WAS BALKING
AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE ON PAYING THE ADDITIONAL CURRENTLY
DUE \$65,000, UNTIL ITS SUSPENDED PROJECTS WERE REACTIVATED.
YOSHIDA STATED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE VIET-
NAMESE GOVERNOR IN VIENNA TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION AND
ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE HIM TO MAKE PAYMENT PRIOR TO THE BOARD'S
CONSIDERATION OF THE REACTIVATION OF THE SAIGON POWER LOAN
PROJECT WHICH COULD BE VOTED UPON IN JUNE. PRESIDENT
YOSHIDA EXPECTED VIETNAM STRONGLY TO OPPOSE THIS APPROACH
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AND ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT THE U.S. ATTITUDE WOULD BE
TO THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL OR TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMPROMISE
WHICH WOULD CALL FOR A SIMULTANEOUS REACTIVATION OF THE
SAIGON LOAN AND THE PAYMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARREARAGES.

3. I NOTED THAT THE QUESTION WAS UNEXPECTED AND THAT OF
COURSE IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE THE

BANK'S REACTIVATION OF THE CREDIT. MY PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT AN ARRANGEMENT, SUCH AS THAT PROPOSED BY VIETNAM OR EVEN THE PRESIDENT (THE SIMULTANEOUS ARRANGEMENT) WOULD GO DOWN BADLY IN WASHINGTON. I NOTED THAT IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF HANOI'S ASSUMPTION OF THE SAIGON SEAT IN THE BANK, WE HAD STATED THAT HANOI WOULD BE REQUIRED TO LIVE UP TO ALL THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE BANK AND CERTAINLY NOT BEING IN DEFAULT WAS SUCH AN OBLIGATION; ALSO IMPLICIT WAS THE EXPECTATION THAT HANOI WOULD NOT RECEIVE ANY SPECIAL CONSIDERATION; THAT ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE COULD ONLY BE REGARDED AS ESTABLISHING A QUID PRO QUO FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE LOAN, WHICH I THOUGHT WOULD BE VERY POORLY REGARDED.

4. YPSHIDA STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD MY POSITION, BUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY ALSO TO CONSIDER THE SITUATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE VIETNAMESE. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE BANK HAS DELIBERATELY STALLED ON THE REACTIVATION OF THEIR LOANS (WHICH PRESIDENT YOSHIDA SAID OF COURSE IS TRUE), AND THAT THERE NOW APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE MISTRUST OF THE BANK IN THE RULING CIRCLES IN HANOI. IN RESPONSE, I NOTED THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL REASONS TO POSTPONE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE OLD CREDIT LINES. IN ANY EVENT, A QUIESCENCE TO THE VIETNAMESE POSITION OR EVEN A COMPROMISE ALONG THE LINES CONTEMPLATED BY THE PRESIDENT COULD ONLY ENDANGER FUTURE U.S. APPROPRI-
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ATIONS TO THE ADF AND EVEN TO THE ADB ITSELF.

5. I URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE BANK FOR IT TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE VIETNAM TO FULFILL ITS PAYMENTS WITHOUT INSISTING ON A DIRECT QUID PRO QUO.

6. PRIOR TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME, THE PRESIDENT HAD DISCUSSED THE QUESTION INFORMALLY WITH OTHER DIRECTORS. REPORTEDLY, ALL EXPRESSED SYMPATHY WITH THE VIETNAMESE POSITION ALTHOUGH TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE THEY DISLIKED THE IDEA OF THE LOAN BEING PROVIDED BY THE BANK UNDER THE CONDITIONS SET DOWN BY VIETNAM. AT LEAST TWO INDICATED THE BANK SHOULD NOT LEND TO A COUNTRY WHEN IT WAS TECHNICALLY IN DEFAULT, ALTHOUGH I AM TOLD LENDING CONTINUED TO PAKISTAN AFTER THE PARTITION, WHEN PAKISTAN WITHHELD PAYMENTS FOR LOANS IN WHAT IS NOW BANGLADESH.

7. THE AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN, AND JAPANESE DIRECTORS PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT WITH THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED SCENARIO.

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AGRE-00 /117 W

-----057317 311211Z /10

R 310857Z MAR 78
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3737

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MANILA 5123

USADB

PASS TREASURY FOR NACHMANOFF

FIRST CHOICE 1) THE PRESIDENT SHOULD PROVIDE THE
VIETNAMESE WITH AN EARLY AND PRECISE DATE AS TO WHEN
THE BANK WOULD REACTIVATE THE SAIGON POWER LOAN;

2) THE PRESIDENT WOULD GIVE AN EARLY
AND PRECISE DATE AS TO WHEN IT WILL SEND MISSIONS TO
VIETNAM CONCERNING THE REACTIVATION OF THE OTHER SUS-
PENDED PROJECTS;

3) IN TURN VIETNAM WOULD IMMEDIATELY
RESUME PAYMENT ON ALL OUTSTANDING LOAN PAYMENTS.

8. AS A FALL BACK POSITION, LETTERS WOULD BE EXCHANGED
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE VIETNAM GOVERNOR WHICH
WOULD CALL FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS RESUMPTION OF PAYMENT
OF ALL LOANS UPON THE REACTIVATION OF THE SAIGON POWER
PROJECT.

9. A SECOND FALLBACK, WHICH THEY WOULD WISH TO
SEND BACK TO THEIR CAPITALS FOR APPROVAL WOULD CALL FOR
VIETNAM TO PAY ITS OUTSTANDING DEBT ON THE SAIGON POWER
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PROJECT WHEN THAT IS APPROVED BY THE BANK, AND AT THE

SAME TIME HAVE VIETNAM ACKNOWLEDGE ITS OBLIGATIONS ON THE OUTSTANDING LOANS DUE ON THE OTHER OUTSTANDING PROJECTS.

10 THE ACTUAL POSITION CONCERNING THE OUTSTANDING LOANS SEEMS TO BE AS FOLLOWS. ELEVEN LOANS WERE PROVIDED TO THE FORMER SAIGON GOVERNMENT COVERING NINE PROJECTS. OF THE NINE PROJECTS, ONE, A FISHERIES PROJECT WAS COMPLETED AND THE HANOI AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO SERVICE ITS PAYMENTS FULLY. THREE LOAN PROJECTS WERE NEVER ACTIVATED AND SO THE QUESTION OF PAYMENT DOES NOT ARISE. OF THE FIVE REMAINING PROJECTS, VIETNAM APPEARS TO BE THINKING A CANCELING A TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT AND REPORTEDLY IS PREPARED TO PAY ALL ITS ARREARAGES ONCE IT DOES SO. THREE IRRIGATION PROJECTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN REAPPRAISED BY THE BANK, AND IT IS ON THESE PROJECT LOANS THAT VIETNAM STATES IT WILL NOT MAKE FUTURE LOAN PAYMENTS UNTIL THEY ARE REAPPRAISED AND REACTIVATED. THE SAME POSITION HOLDS ON THE SAIGON POWER PROJECT WHICH HAS BEEN REAPPRAISED BY THE ADB AND WHICH WOULD BE COMING BEFORE THE BOARD FOR DECISION IN JUNE.

11. MISSION COMMENT

ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAM AUTHORITIES STATE THAT THEY WILL ONLY MAKE PAYMENT ON A SUSPENDED LOAN ONCE IT IS REACTIVATED AND NOT WHILE IT REMAINS IN SUSPENSE.

12. I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH ME, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO SEND A LETTER TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNOR TO BE HAND CARRIED BY THE VIETNAMESE
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ALTERNATE DIRECTOR REITERATING THAT THE BANK BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL THAT ALL ARREARAGES BE PAID UP BEFORE ANY LOANS CAN BE REACTIVATED. HE IS FEARFUL, HOWEVER, THAT VIETNAMESE WILL REMAIN ADAMANT.

13. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT THAT SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL BE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY WILL BE RAISED BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THEIR BILATERAL CONVERSATION. PRESIDENT YOSHIDA ALSO CONCERNED THAT VIETNAMESE GOVERNOR MIGHT RAISE SUBJECT STRONGLY IN HIS SPEECH AND THUS OPEN SUBJECT TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND POSSIBLE DEBATE.
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